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Terrence J. McDonald 
As the epigraph for his enormously influential 1949 
book Social Theorv and Social Structure Robert K. Merton 
selected the now well known opinion of Alfred North 
Whitehead that Ita science which hesitates to forget its 
founders is lost.tt And both history and sociology have been 
struggling with the implications of that statement ever 
since. On the one hand, it was the belief that it was 
possible to forget one's ttfoundersw that galvanized the 
social scientists (including historians) of Mertonfs 
generation to reinvent their disciplines. But on the other 
hand, it was the hubris of that view that ultimately 
undermined the disciplinary authority that they set out to 
construct, for in the end neither their propositions about 
epistemology or society could escape from "history."2 
Social and ideological conflict in American society 
undermined the correspondence between theories of consensus 
and latent functions and the Itrealityn they sought to 
explain; the belief in a single, scientific, transhistorical 
road to cumulative knowledge was assaulted by theories of 
paradigms and incommensurability; marxist theory breached 
the walls of both idealism and the ideology of scientific 
neutrality only to be overrun, in its turn, by the hordes of 
the ttpoststt: post-positivism, post-modernism, post-marxism, 
post-structuralism, and others too numerous to mention. In 
the deepest irony of all, we are here today, in part at 
least, to consider whether the oasis of epistemological 
peace shimmering on the horizon may be -- 
We work now in the twilight of the authorities of that 
generation of historians and sociologists;.their inevitably 
1 The research assistance of Victoria Getis was 
indispensable to this essay and it was improved by many 
conversations with her. I have borrowed the title from the 
poignant short story of the late Raymond Carver, "What We 
Talk About When We Talk About Love," which has a ways seemed 
to say to me that we may do better just to  talk,&%^ 
intangibles, rather than attempting to define them. My 
colleagues in the ItHistoric Turntt group of CSST will see 
that I have tried to steal as many of their ideas as 
possible for this paper. 
2Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure: 
Toward the codification of Theorv and Research (Glencoe, 
1949). 
timebound and theoretically infused version of reality -- 
both nsocialll and epistemological -- is crumbling. The 
complaints of those who believe that we are losing our grip 
on llrealityn are almost right: a certain version of 
reality containing propositions about society, history, 
epistemology, etc. is losing its grip on us. But the 
temptation presented to our era by the "paradigmsIt and the 
llpostsll is to reproduce precisely the same mistake of the 
generation of Merton, to believe seriously that a "new 
(epistemological) order of the agesu is within our grasp; 
perhaps even simply a matter of will. 
This new attempt to "forget one's foundersn is 
particularly damaging for interdisciplinary discussion 
because it ignores the deep inter-relationships among all 
the disciplines reinvented in America after World War Two 
and the ability of those constitutive relationships to 
continually take this conversation in its most sterile 
directions. We are working today within, not beyond the 
disciplinary relationships constructed in that epoch. For 
example, our referents for ~sociology" or "historyw and the 
metaphors of our own conference -- turns, boundaries, the 
attempt to "talk acrossn disciplines, to avoid the "retreat 
behind disciplinary wallstn etc. -- exist not in some 
transhistorical space but in the knowledge of disciplines 
and their interrelationships constructed in this era. It is 
only because of this shared knowledge of what these 
disciplines l1aref1 that we can now talk about work that is 
llinter-disciplinary," tlmultidisciplinary," or "beyond 
disciplinary. 
But this pre-existing relationship is doubled-edged; 
for while it permits us to talk it also tends to maintain 
the conversation within the safe boundaries of pre-existing 
discourse. Should historians use theory? Should 
sociologists do archival research? These questions--and 
others like them focusing on questions of practice -- have 
dominated the discourse between history and sociology 
because they protect and do not destabilize the currently 
operative relationship between these disciplines. Although 
these discussions are carried out with much heat at times-- 
both within and across the disciplines--they serve only to 
prevent discussion of two more dangerous questions: Shall 
history become an object of theory? Shall sociology become 
an object of history. . 
My paper will argue that particular and not obvious 
kinds of atheoretical history and ahistorical sociology 
sprang from the same moment in American intellectual 
history. The constitution of history as a discipline that 
borrowed theory in fact saved it from the responsibility and 
potentially destabilizing effects of producing theory. 
Historians were permitted to borrow theory from sociology 
(and other disciplines) but not to test, generate, or even 
discuss theory themselves. The constitution of sociology as 
a discipline with no sense of itself as an object in history 
prevented (and still prevents) it from recognizing the 
historical contingency of its own discourse. Sociologists 
are able to use history -- it is not correct to say borrow 
it -- as long as they do not allow sociology itself to 
become an object of history. The condition of 
transformation--assuming that such is desired--is that each 
discipline embrace its deepest fear; that history accept the 
potentially destabilizing threat of theory and sociology 
accept the potentially destabilizing threat of history. 
But it is the advocates of interdisciplinary work themselves 
who, in maintaining these relationships in the way that they 
have been structured, fail to recognize this and thus 
prevented such transformation. 
To make this argument I will examine, in their turn, 
history's construction of "itsgt sociology and sociology's 
construction of I1itsgg history. In the case of the former 
which I know better, my argument will be based on an 
analysis of statements about social science and history 
among historians as well as a case study of the sources of 
theory in one of the most important of the joint ventures 
between history and sociology, the so-called nnewtg urban 
history. In the case of the latter, which I describe from 
the gloutside,gg I will similarly examine the historical 
context for and contents of statements about history in 
sociology, focusing in particular on a case study of the 
leading sources of historical theory in 48 articles by 
sociologists on historical sociology. 
.History's Sociolosv 
The inability of history and sociology to imagine a new 
kind of relationship is embedded in the relationship between 
the two constructed in the years following World War Two. 
Like the other social sciences history in these years drank 
deeply of the elixir of the "new." With the help of the 
SSRC historians embarked on a highly successful 
transformation of their own discipline which would involve, 
the demolition of the old wscientificn approach to history 
(with its view of an unmediated relationship with the 
"factsgg) and its replacement by a version of a new 
ggscientificgt approach to history (paralleling that of Merton 
and his counterparts in the social sciences), within which 
middle range theory mediated the relationship between the 
historian and the "factsw both as source of hypotheses and 
guarantor of "~bjectivity.~ 
At the level of epistemology this transformation 
resulted in a permanent separation among the ggactualu past, 
the "recordedN past and the "writtenn past. At the level of 
historiography this produced a spate of "neww histories -- 
e.g. the lgnewgg urban, labor, political, family, etc. -- that 
exploded into prominence in the sixties and seventies and 
that shared a theoretical orientation, some methodological 
sophistication, and a claim to be doing history "from the 
bottom up." 
Most commentaries on this transformation have failed to 
understand the connection between the first change and the 
second, and have, therefore, misconstrued the second as 
essentially a methodological--not theoretical--change. In 
fact, the turn to the social sciences was never, either in 
theory or practice essentially methodological because it was 
necessitated by the destabilizing effects of the 
epistemological separation noted above. Once the unmediated 
search for Itfactslt was exploded as a myth both the danger of 
relativism and the prestige of science convinced many 
historians that it was time to look to the social sciences 
for a model of the disciplining role of theory. Advocates 
of this new relationship between history and social science 
rarely mentioned method. But they did not advocate a Itfull 
fledgedg1 relationship with theory, either. In order for 
theory to do the job that was expected of it historians were 
to remain inferior to theory producing disciplines. They 
could, therefore, borrow theory but not speak of it.3 
However, the necessity for a disciplining role for 
theory was far from the minds of Charles Beard and his 
allies as they wrote the text for the 1946 report of the 
SSRCrs Committee on Historiography, Theorv and Practice in 
Historical Studv. Indeed, the report made only fleeting 
reference to the social sciences at all, noting that 
Itsignificant advances in making the most comprehensive 
historical generalizations will require the close and 
constant cooperation of specialists in historical work with 
specialists in the social sciences and humanities,It but also 
calling for coordination of the work of historians with the 
physical and biological sciences.4 
Beard and his allies had other fish to fry. The first 
of these was to convince the historical profession of the 
tripartite distinction among history as actuality, record, 
and text, and the second to put forward a theory of change 
3For examples of works that see this change as essentially 
methodological, see John Higham, Historv: Professional 
Scholarshi~.in America (Baltimore, 1983), and Peter Novick, 
That Noble Dream: The llObiectivitv Question1I and the 
American Historical Profession (New York, 1988). For an 
argument on this point similar to mine, see Ian Tyrell, The 
Absent Marx: Class Analvsis and Liberal Historv in Twentieth 
Century America (Westport, 1986). 
4Social Science Research Council Committee on 
Historiography, Theorv and Practice in Historical Studv: A 
Re~ort of the Committee on Historiosra~hv (New York, 1946), 
139-140. 
in the last. At the very opening of the report Beard laid 
down the definitions that would inform it. According to 
Beard, "history-as actualityv referred to "all that has been 
felt, thought, imagined, said, and done by human beings as 
such ...," while "history as recordn was "the documents and 
memorials pertaining to history-as-actuality. on which 
written-history is or should be based." "History-as- 
written," therefore, became. the systematic or fragmentary 
narration or account purporting to deal with all or part of 
this history-as-actuality ... "5 
These separations among fghistoryw as actuality, record, 
and text were repeated in the chapter on "Controlling 
Assumptions in the Practice of American  historian^,^^ and 
further strengthened in the chapter on "Problems of 
Terminologyu written by the philosopher Sidney Hook. Other 
approaches were summarily--sometimes humorously--dismissed 
as in this sentence that might bear reading by some 
historical sociologists today: 
l1When we have read John Stuart Mill's Losic 
and absorbed his baconian conception of the nature 
of science, we will eschew all guiding hypotheses 
and indefatigably collect fffacts,n hopefully 
trusting that somehow good, in the form of some 
Msynthesisa8 that will make it all clear will be 
the final goal of all this ill. We will be 
strictly "criticaln and llscientificn 
historians. . . . 116 
The point was, of course, that for Beard such a 
position was fantastic. Because of the separations at the 
outset, there was no history without what the report called 
a "frame of reference," which Hook defined llloosely~~ as "the 
set of principles which guides [the historian] in the 
selection of his problem, the organization of his materials, 
and'the evaluation of his findings." The key question for 
historians, then, was how and why these frames of reference 
changed. The answer that the volume proposed through both 
its descriptive and prescriptive sections was a functional 
one; historians wrote with within a context Itof a problem 
faced by men [in the present], of the causes of that 
problem, the means for its solution, and the course actually 
adopted.l8 The frame of reference for history had been and 
always would be g8functionala1 for the present. This argument 
was supported by an analysis purporting to demonstrate that 
changes in historiography in the twentieth century were 
brought about by the changing social and political agendas 
of American society with, for example, the history of Turner 
and Beard influenced by the progressive reform movement, 
that of the thirties by the "problems of capitalistic 
developmentu and that of the postwar years to be affected by 
a changed international situation.7 
The storm of protest that greeted this volume --amply 
treated by Peter Novick in his 1988 volume on American 
historiography, That Noble Dream --dealt with this 
essentially political functional and avowedly @*presentistn 
theory of historiographical change, not the differences 
among history as actuality, record, and text. (Although 
because the report had both destabilized the fact/framework 
issue and offered this theory of change in the framework 
they were at times confused.) In fact from 1946 until now 
there has been no widely accepted work of historical theory 
that has not recognized these distinctions (if anything they 
have become even more firm and more complicated). The 
question that the volume raised among its critics was, siven 
this separation, was there a more wdisciplinedll source of 
ideas fpr the frame of reference. 
The 1954 report of the historiography committee of the 
SSRC (with mostly new membership) offered a solution that 
was to last for almost 30 years: social science theory would 
provide a stable--indeed llscientific~--source of ideas for 
these frames. This was the first of what would grow to be a 
large number of works by advocates of the social sciences in 
history, including the SSRC volumes, volumes of essays on 
the topic edited by Edward Saveth and Seymour Martin Lipset 
and Richard Hofstadter, and other essays and volumes by H. 
Stuart Hughes, Thomas Cochran, and Robert F. Berkhofer, Jr. 
These authors and volumes disagreed on many things, 
including, for example, how many and how much historians 
would use social science theory and methods, whether history 
should become a social science or merely use social science 
theory to clarify its generalizations, and whether the use 
of social science theory was simply to be an antidote to 
I1Beardian relativismI1 or the route to a cumulative 
historical knowledge gathered according to scientific 
principles. But they also agreed on many things, including 
the rejection of the Baconian belief that synthesis would 
emerge from the "factsItl on the priority of theory over 
method in the relationship between history and the social 
sciences, on the role of theory as a guarantor of 
objectivity, on the necessity and desirability of historians 
importing rather than generating theory, on the preference 
for middle range over ngrandv theory, and of the irrelevance 
of Marxism to this entire enterprise. A brief review of 
these areas of agreement will reveal the way in which 
historians structured a essentially atheoretical 
relationship with the social sciences. 8 
7Ibid., 51, 125. 
8Social Science Research Council Committee on 
Historiography, Theorv and Practice in Historical Studv: A 
Report of the Committee on ~istorioarawhv (New York, 1946); 
The rejection of Baconianism was an assumption so 
deeply rooted in these works that it was seldom given much 
consideration. Just as the 1946 volume of the SSRC 
committee denounced the view that historians could 
indefatigably collect 'facts,' the section on "objectivity, 
certainty, and valuesn in the 1954 report declared that "no 
one now supposes that past history in its totality is 
recoverable, and few believe that 'the facts speak for 
themselves.1ff Similarly, in 1969 Robert F. Berkhofer, Jr., 
admiringly quoted Carl Beckerrs condemnation of the old 
scientific history as "...expecting to obtain final answers 
to life's riddles by absolutely refusing to ask questions-- ... the oddest attempt ever made to get something for 
nothing."9 
It was in large part this belief that steered these 
commentators away from discussion of method and toward 
theory; obsession with method, after all, could become just 
another, more sophisticated kind of Baconianism. More 
important were the sources and types of theory that would 
help to carry history beyond Baconianism. Faithfully 
.reflecting the pecking order of the philosophy of science of 
their time these authors agreed that history was not yet a 
-science and, therefore, not yet capable of generating theory 
.or even, for that matter, cumulative knowledge. For this 
reason, as H. Stuart Hughes put it, their works cast the 
historian "in a comparatively humble role--as a learner 
sitting at the feet of his colleagues in the social 
- sciences. Iflo 
The 1954 report of the SSRC committee on historiography 
-was the locus classicus of this approach. The report 
declared that history as social science "rests on the 
postulate that history can be more than entertainment and 
more than ideologyu and that theory was the route beyond 
both. On the one hand, it was only via theory that history, 
too could become a cumulative science. IfIt is," the report 
Social Science Research Council Committee on Historiography, 
The Social Sciences in Historical Studv (New York, 1954); 
Social Science Research Council, Committee on Historical 
Analysis, Generalization in the Writins of Historv (Chicago, 
1963; Edward N. Saveth, ed., American Historv and the Social 
Sciences (New York, 1964); Seymour Martin Lipset and Richard 
Hofstadter, eds., Socioloav and Historv: Methods (New York, 
1968); H. Stuart Hughes, "The Historian and the Social 
Scientist,If American Historical Review, 66 (1960), 20-46; 
Thomas C. Cochran, The Inner Revolution: Essays on the 
Social Sciences in Historv (New York, 1964); Robert F. 
Berkhofer, Jr., A Behavioral Amroach to Historical Analysis 
(New York, 1969). 
9SSRC, Theorv and Practice, 19; Berkhofer, Behavioral, 23. 
10H. Stuart Hughes, "The Historian and the Social 
Scientistff@ American Historical Review, 66 (1960), 44. 
declared, Ifthe use of theory that permits us to hope that in 
history, as in other sciences, the results of research may 
become increasingly cumulati~e.~~ As importantly, on the 
other hand, it was theory that guaranteed objectivity. 
Contrary to what is sometimes believed by those "outside the 
scientific  discipline^,^^ the report declared I1a set of 
interrelated hypotheses is the best check against 
unconscious bias." Indeed, without such an explicit scheme 
"the data are likely to be subconsciously selected, or 
catalogued on the basis of implicit or surreptitious 
assumptions not subject to a conscious process of analysis 
and rectification." Because of this, it was a high priority 
for this report--and later commentaries--that "principles of 
selection and interpretation ... be rationally chosen and 
rationally established; by making the theories upon which it 
is based explicit and open to objective appraisal.lf 11 
To facilitate this use of theory, the report's central 
section was a review of llconcepts and viewpoints in the 
social  science^,^^ that might be useful to historians. This 
was a chapter by historian Thomas Cochran on the state of 
the theoretical art in anthropology, sociology, demography, 
social psychology, political science, and economics that 
still repays reading. However the limits of Cochran's plan 
for historical social science that were implicit in this 
cook's tour of theory were explicit in his opening 
declaration that "A little knowledge may be a dangerous 
thing, but it is a necessary thing for the general 
historian. 12 
Indeed it was. For a generation that believed, as 
Robert Berkhofer would write in 1969 that the vltheoretical 
conceptions prevalent in his own societyM define the *@limits 
of the historian's objectivityur a Itlittle kno~ledge~~ might 
have even been better than more. Because the goal was a 
stabilized, objective history, not a theorized history, a 
deeper encounter with theory might have been counter- 
productive for it would inevitably have revealed the 
disputes over theory that raged in some of the disciplines. 
Nowhere in the volume were historians encouraged to test 
theory or even attempt to understand it thoroughly. Cochran 
noted somewhat lamely that "if the reader is not quite sure 
that he understands the meaning of the terms and concepts 
mentioned in this chapter, he is in no worse situation than 
other social scientists. Even leading scholars in 
disciplines as closely related as sociology and social 
psychology find difficulty in precise communi~ation.~~ 13 
In fact one of the most popular guides to this 
relationship between history and social science theory--the 
llSSRC, The Social Sciences, 90. 
12Ibid., 34-85. 
13Ibid., 34,83; Berkhofer, Behavioral, 25. 
essay on "The ~istorian and the Social ~cientist,~~ by H. 
Stuart Hughes that was published in the American ~istorical 
Review in 1960--suggested even less engagement. Hughes 
accepted wholeheartedly the view that history would take its 
theory from other disciplines: Itsince history has no 
generalizations of its own--since the' only specifically 
historical category is that of time sequence--it must 
necessarily borrow its intellectual rationale from 
elsewhere." However, the way to apply this theory was quite 
different in Hughesf scheme. For Hughes even the word 
ltapplicationtt of theory was '@too immediate and 'too concrete" 
to describe accurately what the historian may most 
profitably do with.the insights of his fellow workers in the 
social sciences. He continued: 
In many cases, perhaps in a majority of 
cases, he does not really Itapply" them at all. He 
lets them remain in the back of his mind, without 
bringing them explicitly into the foreground of 
his historical writing. He does not parade his 
knowledge of social science theory; he simple 
permits his thought to be informed by it. To the 
unpracticed eye, his prose may remain just as 
untheoretical as in the past. But the new type of 
knowledge he has absorbed will actually have 
worked subterranean alterations in his whole mode 
of thought and expression .... 14 
There were those in this camp who disagreed with 
Hughes, most prominently David Potter in his 1963 
contribution to the SSRC volume Generalization in the 
-Writins of History on ItExplicit Date and Implicit 
Assumptions in Historical Study.I1 For Potter the approach 
recommended by Hughes was precisely the use of I1implicit 
theory" that he criticized. But the more frequent 
references among historians to Hughes than to Potter tell a 
tale of retrenchment along this front that was broader than 
just the essay by Hughes. In fact the 1963 SSRC volume 
itself had pulled back considerably from the great 
expectations of that in 1954, admitting that there were only 
some historians--the report called them the "theoretical 
historianst1--who would use social science theory anyway and 
concluding weakly that "historians borrow ready-made 
generalizations whether they know it or not. If they were 
to borrow them knowingly, they might be in a stronger 
intellectual po~ition.~*l5 
One source from which historians were not to borrow, 
though, was Marx. The utility of Marxism was so thorouqhly 
14Hughes, "Historian," 34. 
15David M. Potter, ggExplicit Data and Implicit Assumptions 
in Historical Study,It in SSRC, Generalization, 178-195; 
Ibid 209. -- I 
discredited in the SSRC volumes that it was rarely even 
mentioned as a source for theoretical borrowing outside of 
them. In the 1954 report ~arxism was not classified as 
social theory at all, but discussed along with a variety of 
conceptions and ~misconceptions" of historical change, 
including evolutionary or theological theories and the works 
of Toynbee and Spengler (works already notorious among 
historians as merely speculative "philosophies of 
history."). According to this report the Marxist 
interpretation lacked validity because of its "limited 
purview of operative forces and the factual fallacy in the 
labor theory of value." The "complex windings of Marxian 
dogmav1 did not result in cumulative knowledge "because it is 
of first importance in Marxian dialectics that each new 
proposition asserted to be true must be logically consistent 
with the words of the master; it is a secondary 
consideration whether or not the words have any empirical 
validity. "16 
In the only essay in the 1963 volume that mentioned 
Marxism in general, Marx remained lodged among the "a 
priorill system builders of the type with whom theoretically 
inclined historians were loathe to be identified. In his 
essay on historical generalization in that volume William 
Aydelotte was at some pains to distinguish the 
generalizations he urged upon historians from those of 
Toynbee, Spengler, and Marx that some historians mistakenly 
confused as generalizations. While declaring that he did 
not advocate Itignoring the larger questions relating to the 
structure of society and politics that have always 
fascinated men," Aydelotte nonetheless argued that "the 
restriction of objectives, in history and the other social 
sciences, may be a sign not of degeneration, but of 
maturity. For him, as for so many of his generation, the 
preference was for those Itmiddle rangen theoretical 
procedures recommended by sociologist Robert Merton.17 
This reluctance to engage with theory--or even to 
recognize a broader menu of theory--has often been ascribed 
to the essentially atheoretical and methodological 
relationship between history and sociology. In this 
argument theory was downplayed because historians-- 
atheoretical to begin with--were really interested in the 
method of the social sciences. But this view is totally 
contradicted by analysis of the actual use of social science 
literature by the most popular and widespread of the l1newH 
histories the "neww urban history. For another purpose I 
have undertaken an analysis of every citation outside of 
history in 140 works (113 articles and 27 books) of American 
urban history published from 1940 through 1985. This has 
16SSRC, Social Sciences, 140. 
17William 0. Aydelotte, I1Notes on the Problem of Historical 
Generalization," in SSRC, Generalization, 145-177. 
netted 1543 such citations for analysis-which reveal that 
this encounter between history and the social sciences was 
broad based, overwhelmingly theoretical, primarily 
sociological, mostly middle-range, and, unsurprisingly, only 
minimally marxist.18 
Of the 113 essays analyzed for this project only 16 
(14%) contained no references to works outside of history 
while 71 (63%) had three or more. Only 39 (2.5%) of the 
1543 citations were explicitly methodological, and of these 
39 the majority had to do with demographic calculations. 
Similarly, there were only 44 (2.9%) citations to the works 
of Marx or Marxists among all of these and the bulk of those 
came after 1980; 24 in a 1983 collection of essays alone. 
However, the lack of attention to Marx, himself, was 
symptomatic of a broader turn away from most classical 
social theory and toward the "middle rangew theory under 
construction in the years after World War 11. References to 
almost all works of classical social theory begin to die out 
in these citations after about 1963 and only about 20 
percent of all these citations were to works of any author 
published before 1950, classical social theorist or 
otherwise. Table I, which lists the most frequently cited 
authors reveals an overwhelmingly sociological bias with a 
special attention to--not surprisingly--urban sociology. 
But it also reveals the popularity of some of the most 
important theorists of the middle range writing in the 1950s 
,and 1960, for example, Merton, Lipset, and political 
scientist Robert Dahl. 
[Table 11 
A- 
There was, however, almost no commentary on this 
theoretical development within the field. What was invoked 
instead of the authority of theory was the authority of the 
theory-producing discipline that produced it. In a famous 
article Itintroducingw urban ~lecologicall~ theory to the field 
of urban history Eric Lampard devoted exactly one paragraph 
to exposition of the theory, noting, instead, that it was 
developed in sociology and was, therefore, "already at 
hand.I8 When in 1967 Charles Tilly lamented that no one 
[among urban historians] was listening to Lampard, he got it 
exactly backward, as Table 1 reveals. What Lampard--and 
others--were talking about was not "theory," but where to 
18For details of this analysis see Terrence J. McDonald, 
"Faiths of our Fathers: Middle Range Social Theory and the 
Remaking of American Urban History," Paper prepared for 
presentation at the I1Modes of Inquiry for American City 
History Conference," Chicago Historical Society, October, 
1990. 
look for theory, and almost everyone was "listeningu to 
urban sociological theory, ecological or otherwise.19 
The problem among historians was that no one was 
talking back to theory. Of more than 40 essays on the state 
of the field of urban history published between 1963 and 
1985 less than half even mentioned theory and only two 
produced very searching analyses of any part of it. As the 
rate of two definitional essays per year reveals, historians 
attempted obsessively to define and redefine the field on 
the terrain of historiography but their labors had about as 
much effect as the handwashings of the obsessive-compulsive 
have on a neurosis. The problem for urban historians went 
deeper than historiography because, whether they admitted it 
or not, the field was, to a great extent, theory driven. 
One result of the inability to confront theory was a 
failure even to begin to rethink the relationship between 
history and sociology. Even the advocates of this 
convergence on the history side offered little that was new. 
The 1954 report of the SSRC committee boldly declared that 
the relationship between history and the social sciences was 
not to be merely "one-wayu because historians could "teach 
much as well.I1 But there were no sections on the 
contribution of historians to social science. Stephan 
Thernstrom offered little more than this in one of the very 
few essays by an historian ever published in the American 
Sociolo~ical Review, his 1965 essay in IfYankee City 
Revisited: The Perils of Historical Naivete.I1 Thernstrom 
pointed out rightly that communication between history and 
sociology had been Itin the form of a monologue; with history 
on the receiving end." But his own article did little to 
challenge that relationship since the not unimportant brunt 
of his lengthy critique of W. Lloyd Warner's studies of 
Newburyport was that Warner didn't have his facts straight. 
Rather than proposing a new relationship between history and 
sociology Thernstrom reinforced the old wherein sociology 
dealt with the theory and history with the facts. In fact 
the choice that Thernstrom offered sociologists regarding 
history was identical to that offered in the 1964 report of 
the SSRC to historians regarding theory. According to 
Thernstrom the student of contemporary society was not "free 
to take his history or leave it alone. ... The real choice 
is between explicit history, based on careful examination of 
the sources, and implicit history, rooted in ideological 
19Eric E. Lampard, "American Historians and the Study of 
Urbanization, American Historical Review, 67 (1961) , 49-61 ; 
Charles Tilly, "The State of urbanization," ~omwarative 
Studies in Society and History, 10 (1967), 103-104. 
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preconceptions and uncritical acceptance of local 
mythology."20 
For their part, allies on the sociology side offered 
little more than backhanded encouragement. Leo Schnorels 
important 1975 essay on "Urban History and the Social 
Sciences: An Uneasy Marriagem1 in the Journal of Urban 
History offered one paragraph under the subheading of 
"Historians Can Help the Social Scientistf1 and eight and a 
half pages on how "Historians May Benefit from Exposure to 
the Social Scientist.If The subject of the one paragraph was 
the infamous--and, as Schnore admitted, essentially vacuous 
-- notion of "historical perspective.If21 
This passive and ultimately untenable role for the 
historian vis a vis the social sciences brought with it two 
positive--if unintended--consequences, a sharpened sense of 
disciplinary self-consciousness and greatly lowered 
boundaries between history and the other disciplines. By 
continuously attempting to resolve the theoretical problems 
of history on the terrain of historiography historians never 
lost a sense of the construction of their discipline in 
history. History is today, therefore, one of the most 
historically self-conscious of the disciplines thanks, in 
large part, to a series of theory-generated transformations 
of the discipline. Similarly, while it was wrong to speak 
of theory, at the level of borrowing ffeverything was 
permitted." Therefore historians have continued to borrow 
massively from other disciplines and their sources of theory 
have spread far beyond sociology into anthropology, literary 
theory, feminist studies, cultural studies, ethnic studies, 
and elsewhere. 
However, neither this heightened sense of history nor 
this broadened base of borrowing can overturn the 
longstanding--and by now quite comfortable--relationship of 
inferiority between history and the social sciences. As the 
recent uproar over the so-called l@linguistic turnw has 
demonstrated, it is not at all clear that historians wish to 
have an Ifopenff relationship with theory. Historians did not 
fail to develop a discourse about theory because they were 
ignorant of it, opposed to it, or dumfounded by it but 
because their relationship with theory was initiated in 
order to provide stability and prestige in a time of 
dangerous relativism. If to speak of theory means to change 
this relationship the silence may remain deafening. 
20SSRC, Social Sciences, 16; Stephan Thernstrom, "'Yankee 
City1 Revisited: The Perils of Historical Naivetetf1 
American Sociolosical Review 30 (1965), 234-242. 
Socioloqv~s Historv 
In one of its first attempts to encourage 
interdisciplinary dialogue the Social Science Research 
Council selected six leading works of social science which 
it then submitted to interdisciplinary panels for evaluation 
at the end of the 1930s. To read the published transcripts 
of the discussions of these evaluation committees in the 
SSRC series Critiques of Research in the Social Sciences is 
to eavesdrop on the founding conversation about modern work 
across the disciplines, including history and sociology. The 
importance of this conversation for our purposes is that it 
set out a role for history in the social sciences generally 
and vis a vis sociology in particular that would remain 
prevalent, in spite of dramatic changes in historical 
practice, down to the present day. 22 
From history the SSRC selected for analysis historian 
Walter Prescott Webb's book The Great Plains: A Studv in 
Institutions and Environment which had been published in 
1931 and the committee assigned another western historian, 
Fred Shannon, to prepare a critique that the committee would 
then discuss. Shannon produced 200 pages of empirical 
critique that included such gems as the complaint that 
Webb's description of jackrabbit hunting was inadequate and 
Webb was so enraged by the evaluation and discussion of his 
book that he denied at the end that it was a work of 
I1history1l at all. Inevitably, then, much of the discussion 
by the interdisciplinary panel which met in September of 
1939 revolved around the proper relationship between facts 
and theory--or as it was referred to in the discussions, 
generalizations, hypotheses, or frames of reference. The 
evaluation committee included such giants of that epoch of 
social science as Louis Wirth from Sociology, Robert 
Redfield from Anthropology, and Arthur M. Schlesinger and 
Roy Nichols from History, both of whom were strong allies of 
interdisciplinary work in history. 
The historians on the committee clearly worked to 
minimize the bitterness between Webb and Shannon--and thus 
improve the potential reception of the exercise among 
historians--by adopting the position that there was room in 
the profession for all "typesw of historians. Historian 
John D. Hicks argued that historians fell into two 
categories "those who are interested in the woods as a whole 
and those who are interested in the trees, leaf by leaf." 
21Leo F. Schnore, "Urban History and the Social Sciences: 
An Uneasy Marriage," Journal of Urban Historv 1 (1975)' 395- 
408. 
22 Social Science Research Council, Critiques of Research in 
the Social Sciences 111: An Appraisal of Walter Prescott 
Webb's The Great Plains: A Studv in Institutions and 
Environment (New York, 1940). 
While each group antagonized the other; there would always 
be such divisions among historians.23 
Wirth, however, held out fo= a more rigorous 
specification of the relationship between "factsw and 
ttgeneralizationw across all categories of history. What 
historians, whether of the forest or trees, often failed to 
realize, according to Wirth, was that Itfacts are made; they 
are not just found." "You cannot just look the world in the 
face and expect to discover a fact,I1 Wirth argued, because 
facts "are always made in the light of some hypotheses." 
Failure to recognize this relationship between facts and 
hypotheses was what Wirth identified as the major problem 
among historians;-they "are not explicitly aware of the 
theories upon which they proceed and therefore naively 
conclude that they have none." 
Yet Wirthfs own understanding of the relationship 
between facts and generalizations in general led him to send 
somewhat mixed messages to historians. At one point in the 
discussion he declared that "what we want, first of all, 
from the historians is authentic facts. Whether historians 
'should generalize is a very complicated question. Their 
2best service to social science, I think, is actually digging 
up the facts--bricks out of which some theoretic structure 
(generalization) may arise." Yet at another point he 
reminded them that historians, too, must work within a 
#"frame of referenceu to find the facts: 
I hope historians will stick to the facts. Their 
concern should be to give us the fact--accurate, 
reliable facts. I realize, however, that nobody 
can get facts unless he has some frame of 
reference within which those facts appear.24 
Now as we have seen, historians themselves took up 
Wirthfs call for the collection of wfactsll within frames of 
reference beginning in 1946. Searching both for lvscienceft 
and "objectivityw they borrowed massively from the social 
sciences--especially sociology--and transformed historical 
practice. Indeed the works of the "newg1 social history, 
while not producing a discourse on theory among historians, 
nonetheless effectively ended the epoch oE purely 
llhistorical fact.!# Today there are few "historical" facts 
that have not already been infused by (mostly sociological) 
theory. 
But there has been little recognition of this momentous 
transformation in historical practice among sociologists 
friendly to history. Thirty years after Wirth, during the 
high tide of history's construction of its sociology one of 
the major bridge figures in this effort, Seymour Martin 
Lipset, would make almost the same point as Wirth: 
ItHistory must be concerned with the analysis 
of the particular set of eventsor- processes. 
Where the sociologist looks for concepts which 
subsume a variety of particular descriptive 
categories, the historian must remain close to the 
actual happenings and avoid statements which, 
though linking behavior at one time or place to 
that elsewhere, lead to a distortion in the 
description of what occurred in the set of 
circumstances being analyzed."25 
Even critics of Lipset's division of "theorym for 
sociology and tffactsll for history have tended to reproduce 
similar distinctions between history and sociology. In one 
of the most frequently cited --and most thoughtful-- 
discussions of the encounter between history and sociolosv, 
Charles Tilly' s 1981 book, As Socioloav ~eets Historv, ~ i i i ~  
rejects Lipset's division in principle, but then reproduces 
it in his description of disciplinary practices. He notes, 
for example, that the authors analyzed by Arthur Stinchcombe 
in Theoretical Methods in Social Historv are not "archive- 
mongering professional historians," and contrasts the effort 
of sociologists to "brinq data to bear on two conflictina 
hypothesesfi with the historian's imitation of the procedire 
of the "literary critic: moving ... from reinterpretation to 
reinterpretationnt with each reinterpretation producing "a 
new understanding of the place, time phenomenon, and 
underlying question under study.I1 More recently Theda 
Skocpol has similarly contrasted the "interpretive 
sociologyn of a Geertz or Thompson with the lvanalyticalu 
sociology that she practices. The former has the virtues of 
a llgood Flaubert novel,t1 while her brand of work analyzes 
the ltf acts1! in search of "causal regularities. "26 
According to Tilly "an analysis is historical to the 
extent that the place and time of the action enter into its 
 explanation^.^^ But for almost 50 years now, the "place and 
time of the actionvv between history and sociology have 
seemed irrelevant to sociological commentators on it. Why 
is it that sociologists reproduce this wfrozen*w image of 
25 Seymour Martin Lipset, "History and Sociology: Some 
Methodological  consideration^,^^ in Lipset and Richard 
Hof stadter , eds. , Sociolosv and Histoi-v: Methods (New York, 
1968). 
26~harles Tilly, As Socioloa~ Meets Historv. (NY: Academic 
Press, 1981); Arthur L. Stinchcombe, Theoretical Methods in 
Social Historv (NY: Academic Press, 1978); Theda Skocpol, 
ed. Vision and Method in Historical Sociolosv. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1984). 
historical practice? The answer to this question requires 
analysis of sociologyrs experience with historical analysis, 
and the theoretical sources for its construction of 
nhistory.tt But it also requires consideration of an issue 
that few advocates of historical sociology have considered: 
sociologyts deep fear of becoming, itself, an object of 
history. For just as historians feared and avoided the 
destabilizing effects of a discourse around theory 
sociologists have feared the threat from their own history, 
from the moment when their discourse of ltscience,ll It cause," 
"variable," and "analysis1I is revealed, in its turn, to be 
historically contingent. 
For all of the recent talk about sociology's 
"historical imagination,It the discipline's encounter with 
history has, not surprisingly, been both relatively minimal 
and relatively recent. A survey of specialities of members 
of the American Sociological Association in 1959 (almost 
half of whom received their degrees before 1950) revealed 
only .2% who listed first a speciality in historical 
sociology or social history. And this lack of interest was 
- reflected in articles published in the field's major 
journals. Analysis of the tables of contents for every year 
of the American Journal of Socioloav (1895196-1990/91) and 
the American Socioloaical Review (1936137-1990/91) reveals a 
total of only 13 articles in the former and 11 in the latter 
on the relationship between history and sociology and only 
95 articles in the former and 54 in the latter with 
historical content. In the AJS articles with historical 
content averaged about 5.5% of the total annually; in the 
ASR about 6.6%. In the ASR this annual average is 
consistently above the mean only after the 1975176 volume; 
in the AJS only after 1978179. In the American case, at 
least, it is incorrect to say that sociology is 
rediscovering its "past," unless that means its past 15 
years. 27 
Similarly, the sources upon which sociology is 
constructing its "historyu are both relatively recent and 
overwhelmingly sociological. In Table 2 I have listed (in 
order of frequency of citation) the authors of the most 
frequently cited (i.e. 9 or more citations) sources of 
theorv (of history and otherwise) in 48 programmatic essays 
by sociologists on historical sociology or history and 
sociology published since 1957. The recency of the 
references is explained by the recent appearance of most of 
the articles (listed in the appendix). The absence of 
historians among the most frequent.1~ cited is, of course, 
the striking thing about this list. In the top 25 authors 
cited there are only four historians: Stedman-Jones (7 
27Richard L. Simpson, "Expanding and Declining Fields in 
American So~iology,~~ American Socioloaical Review, 26 
(1961), 458-466. Data on articles is from my own survey. 
citations), Thompson ( 7 ) ,  Bloch (5) Carr (5). Both the 
theoretical legitimizers of historical sociology (e.g. 
Giddens and Stinchcombe) and the practicing commentators on 
it (e.g. Tilly and Skocpol) are sociologists, with Skocpol 
having more than twice and Tilly more than three times the 
number of citations of the leading historians. 
[Table 21 . 
Is it safe for historical sociology to be constructed 
solely by representatives from a discipline which, as 
Giddens has noted, has vvrepressedvv history? In fact it can 
be argued that at the core of sociologyfs whistorical 
imaginationvv is a persistent attempt to imagine itself as 
exempt from history. To some extent, therefore, a battle on 
another front--between the forces-of "presentismvv and 
vvhistoricismvv in the history of sociology--helps to set the 
limits on history in sociology. 
In the case of American sociology, at least, this 
ahistorical tendency in the history of sociology, too, 
springs from the fertile brain of Merton and his important 
distinction between the vvhistoryvv and vvsystematics~ of 
sociological theory. Mertonts call for social science to 
fitforget its foundersvv entailed not only the reinvention of 
disciplinary practice but also the end in any real sense of 
disciplinary history. His own words on this crucial issue 
in the 1949 edition of Social Theory and Social Structure 
bear repetition: 
'!The attractive but fatal confusion of 
utilizable sociological theory with the history of 
sociological theory ... should long since have been 
dispelled by recognizing their very different 
functions. After all, schools of medicine do not 
confuse the history of medicine with current 
medical hypotheses, nor do departments of biology 
identify the history of biology with the viable 
theory now employed in guiding and interpreting 
biological research. Once said, this seems 
obvious enough to be embarrassing. Yet the 
extraordinary fact is that in sociology, this 
plain distinction between the history of theory 
and currently operating theory has in many places 
not caught hold.... 11 
For Merton the analogy between natural and social 
science was the crucial legitimation for the separation 
between history and theory. Therefore, vvsystematic 
sociological theoryvv represented "the highly 'selective 
accumulation of those small parts of earlier theory which 
have thus far survived the tests of empirical research." 
The history of theory included vvalso the far greater mass of 
conceptions which fell to bits when confronted with 
empirical test. Though ffacquaintancefl with "all thisf1 
(history) might be useful for sociologists, Merton believed 
that it was "no substitute for training in the actual use of 
theory in research." What he called the "prehistory of 
sociology~ was "very far from curnulati~e,~~ and, therefore, 
the contemporary sociologists were not--in the famous phrase 
of Newton that Merton was to make so much of-- "pigmies 
standing on the shoulders of giants." In fact, "the 
accumulative tradition is still so slight that the shoulders 
of the giants of sociological science do not provide a very 
solid base on which to stand."28 
This distinction--which Merton was to repeat and 
fortify--had two somewhat contradictory consequences within 
sociology. On the one hand sociologists would cohabit with 
the wfounderslf (e.g. classical social theorists) to the 
extent that they had produced ideas that not fallen to bits 
"when confronted with empirical test." On the other hand, 
they were implicitly forbidden to consider the historical 
context of transformations in sociological theory or 
practice, including their own. Invocations of the 
fffoundersn would be widespread both as inspiration and 
legitimation, ffmiddle-rangew operationalization and testing 
of their theories would be permitted, but analysis of the 
construction of sociologyls modes of inquiry would 
prohibited. 
- With the period before 1949 placed behind the Ifveil" of 
"prehistoryff sociologists were spared the potentially 
unedifying sight of the triumph of recent tendencies in 
sociological theory and method and allowed to believe that 
t h e  present development of sociological science was 
-occurring flabovell history. The historical development of 
such tools as ffcause, llvariable, l1 or "general linear 
model," was ignored as were the contemporary appropriation 
of dichotomies from philosophy and elsewhere (e.g. 
idiographic, nomothetic; context of discovery, context of 
justification; analytic, interpretive) that justified 
particular kinds of sociological practice. What history of 
sociology there was came increasingly to resemble the 
regnant nhistoryll of science before Kuhn, which, as Kuhn has 
noted, worked for both pedagogic and persuasive--but not 
historical--ends by chronicling the wsuccessive incrementsn 
of cumulative knowledge and the ffcongeries of error, myth, 
and superstition that have inhibited the more rapid 
accumulation of the constituents of the modern science 
text.If (As we have seen, this was Mertonls own description 
of history.) Not surprisingly, sociologyls self-image became 
not as a discipline constructed in a certain place and time, 
- -~ 
28Merton, Social Theory, 3-5. 
but a uusciencelu developing principles (of both theory and 
practice) relevant for all places and all times.29 
This problem of sociology's historical self- 
consciousness has only recently--but increasingly--been 
noted by historians of sociology as the problem of 
nhistoricismn versus "presentismu in the history of 
sociology. This debate, as carried out by Stephen Seidman 
and others revolves around whether in the history of 
sociology it is legitimate to "interpret texts in relation 
to the current theoretical context,u1 (the presentist 
position) or whether a genuine history of sociology must be 
anchored in the historical context (the historicist 
position). Although this debate is recent--because the 
post-Kuhnian field of history of sociology is only about a 
decade old--its terms portend significant changes in the 
relationship between history and theory within sociology. 
For the whistoricistw argument is that presentist approaches 
result in a narrative of scientific progress and 
enlightenment which tends toward an ideological 
reconstruction aimed at legitimating current theoretical or 
methodological positions. Just as a new empirical (but 
whistoricistlu) history of science destabilized the 
philosophy of science (and social science) a new 
uuhistoricistuu history of sociology has the potential to 
relativize and destabilize current sociological practice.30 
Most of the (brief) histories of historical sociology 
presented by its advocates focus on the disjunction between 
that tendency and what Randall Collins has called "mid- 
centuryu1 sociology. But there are also powerful continuities 
between them in their constructions of and claim to 
"scientificuu status. What I have called the vufrozenlu image 
of historical practice is a result of this continuity. This 
image, as we can now see, is doubly functional for 
mainstream sociology for by trivializing nhistoryul as 
unscientific the discipline is spared both the relativizing 
dangers of its own history and the potential threat to the 
mainstream from historical sociology. But some historical 
sociologists, themselves, exhibit little historical self- 
consciousness and consciously or not over-emphasize the 
differences between their work and that of historians for 
the same reasons, so as to validate their own claim to the 
Iuscientificw status of the mainstream.31 
29T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 
(Chicago, 1970) , 1-2. 
30For a useful introduction to these issues see Stephen 
Seidman et al.,  he Historicist Controversy: understanding 
the Sociological Past, Socioloaical Theorv 3 (1985) , 13-28. 
31Randall Collins, Sociolosv Since Mid-Century: Essavs in 
Theorv Cumulation (New York, 1981). 
The variety of these tendencies among historical 
sociologists is exhibited in the programmatic statements of 
the four most frequently cited influences on historical 
sociology: Tilly, Skocpol, Giddens, and Stinchcombe. While 
all of these authors have produced works of great importance 
for all practitioners of history there are, nonetheless, 
notable differences in their positions on the possibility of 
a unified tthistorical social science.@' On this point the 
two theorists of historical practice bracket the two 
practitioners. The more conventional empiricism of 
Stinchcombe links the historical sociology of the present 
more firmly to the llsciencev of the past and legitimates 
continuing separation between history and sociology, while 
the more radical I1historicityn of Giddens leads to a 
critique of scientific Nnaturalismw in the past and thereby 
legitimates disciplinary convergence in the future. 
Stinchcombers somewhat idiosyncratic Theoretical 
Methods in Social History offers an unselfconscious 
empiricist plague on the houses both of 81historyw and 
t8theory11 that is delivered with little interest in (or 
apparent information about) the doings of professional 
historians. Stinchcombers empiricism can be called 
conventional because it is anchored--like Mertonrs--in the 
-analogy to the physical sciences: "It is not necessary to 
ignore the facts in order to have general concepts, as the 
example of the physical sciences shows. The argument of 
- this book is that it is not only not necessary, it is also a 
' bad idea.I1 What he calls 8nepochal interpretations" (grand 
theories) ignore the facts by prematurely applying theory to 
them, "giving a specious sense that we understand the nature 
of the society we live in by providing a myth of how it came 
about--a myth illustrated with historical events.It 
Narrative histories, on the other hand, "ignore the factsn 
by giving the false (linguistic) impression that the 
narrative is causal when, in fact, narratives must be broken 
down into "theoretically understandable bits" before causal 
analysis can proceed via his method of deep analogy. For 
Stinchcombe the "theoretical methodM in social history 
requires both detaching the narrative from its "naive 
epistemological  mooring^,^^ and "tossing out the epochal 
(theoretical) garbage."32 
At the other end of the spectrum stands Giddens whose 
characterization of the differences between the natural and 
social sciences and similarities between the latter and 
history distinguish him sharply from Stinchcombe. For 
Giddens there were three components of wmid-centurytl 
sociology (or what he calls the orthodox consensus); a set 
of statements about llindustrialN society, a set of 
theoretical propositions loosely called llfunctionalismw and 
a set of statements about similarities in the historical 
32Stinchcombe, Theoretical, 
development and logical structure of the social and natural 
sciences that he calls wnaturalism.ll While the rebellion 
against the first two is widespread, the predominance of the 
third remains less seriously challenged. It is, of course, 
the residue of this view that undergirds contrasts between 
(scientific) llanalysisw and (discursive) "interpretation11 
and, therefore I1historyl1 and wsociology.n By rejecting this 
naturalism Giddens is able to argue that because of their 
shared theoretical problematics and methodological 
challenges there is no llintellectually defensiblet1 division 
between history and social science. Elaborated most 
completely in The Constitution of Societv, Giddensf 
argument recognizes both the transformation in historical 
practice and the interpretive nature of much of sociological 
practice. Agreeing with Philip Abrams that the 
tlacknowledged masterpieces of the discipline of history have 
become increasingly theoretically explicit,11 Giddens argues 
that the problems of social theory, of agency, structure and 
forms of explanation are "problems shared in general by all 
the social sciences.11 Furthermore, he contends that because 
most social science work is conducted l1in and through textst1 
the methodological problems of making sense of texts are 
also shared by history and the social sciences.33 
It would be wrong to say that the most frequently cited 
practitioners--Tilly and Skocpol--are ranged between 
Stinchcombe and Giddens because both are more closely linked 
to the former, and therefore to mid-century naturalism, than 
to the latter. For example, both Tilly and Skocpol cite 
Stinchcombe, but in their programmatic work through 1984, 
neither cites anything by Giddens. While both are 
undoubtedly critics of the mid-century orthodoxies that 
Giddens labels "industrial societyu and llfunctionalism,tl 
neither totally rejects the naturalism that Giddens 
criticizes and both, therefore, uphold the distinctions 
between llanalysisn and "interpretationn that have replaced 
I1theoryu versus tlfactsw as the language of separation 
between llsociologylt and "history. 
As we have seen, even in his rejection of the 
longstanding division of labor of "theoryv and "factsw 
between sociology and history Tilly has reproduced the 
separation between the two on another terrain. Although his 
portrayal of the distinguishing features of the historical 
profession are quite similar to those of Giddens, Tilly has 
not called for a Itgeneral rapprochementn between history and 
sociology, but I1a highly selective shift of particular 
topics to historical analyses and historical materials." 
According to Tilly, historians group and gloss texts (the 
written residues of the past) in order to reconstruct past 
33Anthony Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theorv 
(Berkeley, 1979), 230-233; 234-259; Giddens, The 
Constitution of Societv (Berkeley, 1984), 355-363. 
human behavior and they consider "where, and especially when 
an event occurred to be an integral part of its meaning, 
explanation and impact." But sociologists are not turning 
into historians because Itthey are not learning to do 
archival research ... taking their questions from the 
prevailing historical agenda, or suppressing their 
-inclinations to explicit modeling, careful measurement, and 
deliberate comparis~n.~~ They are not, to use his earlier 
terms, either- mongering archives or succumbing to 
interpretation.34 
Skocpol has maintained a similar division, but 
incorporated it into sociology in her essay on "Emerging 
Agendas and Recurrent Strategies in Historical SociologyfU 
in Vision and Method in Historical Sociolouv. While 
professing a buoyant methodological pluralism--"Surely it 
would be a mistake to tie historical sociology down to any 
one epistemological, theoretical, or methodological 
deve10pment.~~--Skocpol leaves little doubt about her 
preference for tlanalyticalll over what she calls 
vlinterpretiven historical sociology. In language deeply 
indebted to Stinchcombe she describes the former branch of 
.sociology as involving the search for "causal regularitiesn 
without an effort to "analyze historical facts according to 
- a preconceived general model.tv Because good analytic 
history requires that the "unities of time and place be 
broken for the purposes of drawing comparison and testing 
hypotheses," analytical sociologists must neither be fazed 
by the demand of some historians that they use "primary 
sourcest1 nor let their findings be "dictated simply by 
historiographical fashions that vary from case to case or 
time to time." Interpretive sociology, on the other hand, 
(which for her includes--somewhat strangely--the work of E. 
P. Thompson and Clifford Geertz) displays Itan insouciance 
about establishing valid explanatory modelst1 that, from the 
standpoint of those 18concerned with causal validityn in 
their analyses can be I1misleading even when they are 
~ompelling.~~ Interpretive works '!seem extraordinarily vivid 
and full, like a good Flaubert novel," but their appeal is 
only to "others who share their sense of problems and their 
world views."35 
But, of course, the same thing could be said of 
Stinchcombe and Skocpol, themselves. For only those who 
share their sense of the untheorized historical llfact,fl the 
Itgarbagen of epochal theory, and the "naiveten of narrative 
will apparently be convinced by their analyses. Stinchcombe 
defends himself from the knowledge that historians produce 
only theorized facts by selecting for analysis only 
34Tilly, As Sociolouv Meets Historv, 43,14. 
35 Theda Skocpol, "Emerging Agendas and Recurrent Strategies 
in Historical Sociologyftl in Skocpol, ed. Vision and Method 
in Historical Sociolouv, 356-391. 
"historiansn--Tocqueville, Trotsky, Bendix, and Smelser--who 
have not participated in the theoretical transformation of 
history. (And this, not their lack of "archive mongering1! 
is, pace Tilly, the point.) By trivializing 
~thistoriographical fashionsM Skocpol makes much the same 
mistake, ignoring the increasingly sophisticated discussions 
of historical practice in that literature over the last two 
decades and substituting in its place a resurrected J. S. 
Mill whose Loaic was rejected with sarcasm by historians 50 
years ago not because they couldnft talk about method but 
because, as ~ichael Burawoy has recently argued, Mill 
himself doubted the utility of the "method of inductionm1 for 
the social sciences.36 
Skocpolfs commitment to a Itsingle world view" must also 
be detected in her refusal to apply her own ttcomparative 
historical methodn1 to the differences between herself and 
Stinchcombe on the one hand and British sociologists like 
Abrams and Giddens on the other. This brief perusal of the 
works of all four reveals what she would call the "crucial 
difference": among the latter an almost complete absence of 
a rhetoric of "sciencew that justifies continuing 
differences between history and sociology. Now because this 
absence occurs in spite of "overall similaritiesI1 in the 
emergence and spread of professionalized sociology and 
history in the post World War Two years in Britain and the 
United States it makes a good case for her Itmethod of 
difference.#! John Hall's 1989 article "They do things 
differently there, or, the contribution of British 
historical so~iology,~~ outlines briefly the "causal 
configurationIg that explains the outcome of interest: a pre- 
existing body of sociological work on British social 
structure that led to a relative immunity to Parsonian 
functionalism, a favorable response in Britain to the 
earliest postwar American historical sociologists (e.g. 
Bendix, Lipset, Mills, Moore) and an early and close 
intellectual and political partnership between sociologists 
and practitioners of I1history from belowu1 (e.g. Thompson, 
Williams, Hoggart). Skocpol's *Icanons of inductiont1 would 
seem to suggest that Stinchcombe and Skocpol speak not in 
the universal language of llscience,w but in the provincial, 
flscientisticn argot of American academe.37 
It is the failure to recognize this crucial point that 
detracts from what is otherwise without doubt one of the 
most brilliant analyses of historical sociology to ,date, 
Michael Burawoyfs 1989 article "Two Methods in Search of 
36Michael Burawoy, IfTwo Methods in Search of Science: 
Skocpol Versus Trotsky." Theory and Society v. 18, no. 6 
(Nov. 1989) : 759-806. 
37John A. Hall, ItThey Do Things Differently There, or, the 
Contribution of British Historical So~iology.~~ British 
Journal of Socioloav v. 40, no. 4 (Dec. 1989): 544-564. 
Science: Skocpol versus Tr~tsky.~~ This is a lengthy and 
devastating critique of Skocpol's methodological 
pronouncements that discusses, among other things, her 
contradictory attempt to produce historical sociology while 
standing tgoutside" of history, and that, therefore, 
challenges her positions on "factsfgt gghistoriography,gg and 
gltheory.tg But because his discussion is conducted almost 
entirely in the language of a Popperian philosophy of 
science, Burawoy fails to realize that his own categories do 
not stand tgoutsidegt of history, either. The unasked 
question is whether the prominence of these categories or 
the metaphor of the "research programgt are not themselves 
worthy of historical analysis. If they are then he has 
stopped his historical analysis just one step short of where 
it might have gone. In so doing, however, he has revealed 
the "hard coren of the research program for historical 
sociology that he had Skocpol share completely: that 
everything is an object of "historyw except sociology 
itself. 38 
Two Pasts: How Manv Futures? 
-. 
In a comparison of the methods and agendas of 
*historical sociology and social history Skocpol has compared 
:them to the proverbial "two trains passing in opposite 
directions in the night." This essay has argued somewhat 
differently and the metaphor it has sought to support is 
-that of two trains hurtling down parallel tracks toward 
- different kinds of derailment.39 
For historians the tracks are weak at the intersection 
- of history and theory. In 1963 at the dawn of the 
-.relationship between history and social science that we have 
just considered the historian A. S. Eisenstadt wondered if, 
in a time of philosophical dismantling, "we do not take 
sides, we only take cover." From that day until this 
historians have tried to "take cover," by borrowing theory 
from other, allegedly more advanced disciplines with little 
or no commentary on the controversies over theory within 
those disciplines or the effects of theory within history. 
Both continued borrowing and increasing historical self- 
consciousness have eaten way at the ties at this point on 
this track.40 
For sociologists the tracks are weakest at the 
intersection of historical sociology and disciplinary 
38Burawoy, ItMethods .
39Skocpo1, Theda. gtSocial History and Historical Sociology: 
Contrasts and Cornplementaritie~.~~ Social Science Historv v. 
11, no. 1 (Spring 1987) : 17-30. 
40A.S. Eisenstadt, "American History and Social Science," in 
Eisenstadt, ed., The Craft of American Historv, I1 (New 
York, 1966, 110-125. 
history. Charles Tilly has noted that a @@hiddenm piece of 
history Itroots most sociology in the present.It And that 
@@piece of historyut is the piece that sociologists are 
currently living. For almost forty years sociology has lived 
in an eternal present, free from both its own "historyM and, 
until quite recently, from many practitioners of historical 
sociology. Because of this, unfortunately, its historical 
practitioners have little sense of the way that they have 
retained links with the traditions they think they have 
superseded. And for now, at least, they patrol the tracks 
zealously, apparently worried that interpretive sappers may 
blow them up.41 
There is no logical reason to expect disciplinary 
convergence either pre- or post-derailment, nor is it clear 
that the human sciences would be improved if they did 
converge. But the flesh and blood evidence of a room full 
of track jumpers, switchpersons, and hoboes like those at 
this conference reminds us that anything is possible. 
41Tilly, As Sociolosv Meets History, 214. 
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